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SUMMARY 
A magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 
February 2011. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted 
in widespread damage to the built environment, including significant disruption to the 
lifelines. The event created the largest lifeline disruption in a New Zealand city in 80 years, 
with much of the damage resulting from extensive and severe liquefaction in the Christchurch 
urban area. The Christchurch earthquake occurred when the Canterbury region and its lifelines 
systems were at the early stage of recovering from the 4 September 2010 Darfield 
(Canterbury) magnitude 7.1 earthquake. This paper describes the impact of the Christchurch 
earthquake on lifelines by briefly summarising the physical damage to the networks, the 
system performance and the operational response during the emergency management and the  
recovery phase. Special focus is given to the performance and management of the gas, electric 
and road networks and to the liquefaction ejecta clean-up operations that contributed to the 
rapid reinstatement of the functionality of many of the lifelines. The water and wastewater 
system performances are also summarized.  Elements of resilience that contributed to good 
network performance or to efficient emergency and recovery management are highlighted in 
the paper.
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                              INTRODUCTION 
A devastating magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of 
Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011. The 
earthquake killed 182 people, caused a large number of 
injuries and widespread damage to the built environment.  The 
earthquake was very shallow and the epicentre very close (<10 
km) to the city which created extremely high ground 
accelerations across the city.  This event occurred when the 
Canterbury region and its engineering lifelines systems were 
at the early stage of recovering from the 4 September 2010 
Darfield (Canterbury) magnitude 7.1 earthquake.  
The impact of the 22nd February earthquake on the lifelines 
functionality was severe.  The event created the largest lifeline 
disruption in a New Zealand city since the 1931 Hawke‟s Bay 
earthquake devastated Napier and Hastings. Much of the 
damage and disruption in Christchurch has been the result of 
wide spread and severe liquefaction in the Christchurch urban 
area.  
However, it must be acknowledged that the strong “lifelines 
culture”, promoted in New Zealand by Local Lifelines groups 
and a National Engineering Lifelines Committee, the 
Earthquake Commission and the Ministry of Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management, reduced the physical and 
functional impact of the earthquakes on lifelines systems.  
The Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 
(CDEM 2002) requires lifeline utilities “to be able to function 
to the fullest possible extent”, even though this may be at a 
reduced level, during and after an emergency. The National 
Engineering Lifelines Committee, NELC, in New Zealand, 
defines Lifelines Engineering as “an informal, regionally-
based process of lifeline utility representatives working with 
scientists, engineers and emergency managers to identify 
interdependencies and vulnerabilities to regional scale 
emergencies. This collaborative process provides a framework 
to enable integration of asset management, risk management 
and emergency management across utilities.” (NELC, 2007).  
There are 16 Regional Lifelines groups across New Zealand, 
with national representation and coordination undertaken by 
the National Engineering Lifeline Committee (est. 1999).   
There has been a strong focus on engineering lifelines in 
Christchurch.  The Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Project 
BULLETIN OF THE NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY FOR EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING, Vol. 44, No. 4, December 2011 
403 
was completed in 1994 for the Christchurch metropolitan area 
and published in “Risks and Realities” in 1997.  This was 
followed by the formation of the Christchurch Engineering 
Lifelines Group (Canterbury CDEM Group, 2010). In 2004, a 
Canterbury Engineering Lifelines Group formed with a focus 
on further enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructure 
and is financially supported by the Canterbury Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management, CDEM Group. During an 
emergency, infrastructure response and recovery efforts fall 
within CDEM arrangements (see the National CDEM 
Strategy, MCDEM 2007, for more information).  Lifelines 
Utility Recovery Task Teams are established at both territorial 
authority and CDEM Group levels, to assist in coordinating 
potential recovery efforts (Canterbury CDEM Group, 2010). 
This paper presents the impact of the Christchurch earthquake 
on a few lifeline systems briefly summarising the physical 
damage to the networks, the system performances and the 
operational responses during the emergency management and 
the recovery phase. We present some background information 
on the earthquake and the severe geotechnical secondary 
hazards induced by the earthquake.  Special focus is given to 
the performance and management of the gas, electric and road 
networks and to the liquefaction clean-up operations that 
highly contributed to the rapid reinstatement of many of the 
lifelines. A complete overview of the physical and functional 
performance for all the infrastructure and lifelines systems is 
out of the scope of the paper. 
THE 22 FEBRUARY 2011 CHRISTCHURCH 
EARTHQUAKE 
New Zealand is located at a plate boundary between the 
Pacific and Australian plates (Figure 1).  It is also where the 
plate boundary changes from a subduction zone running down 
the east coast of the North Island which terminates off the 
northeast coast of the South Island (about 100 km north of 
Christchurch) to a transform boundary cutting through the 
continental crust of the South Island.  Here the plate motions 
are accommodated by largely dextral strike-slip on the faults 
of the Marlborough Fault Zone and the Alpine Fault (Figure 
2). However, all of the relative motions between the 
Australian and Pacific plates are not accommodated on one or 
two faults in a narrow zone, but on many faults across a much 
wider zone where large near-plate-boundary faults 
accommodate this complex distributed deformation.  
Significant to the recent Canterbury earthquakes, some of the 
plate boundary deformation in this transition zone is probably 
being transferred into Canterbury, where it is accommodated 
by dextral strike-slip faulting. 
 
Figure 1: Pacific and Australian plate boundary 
crossing New Zealand. 
Figure 2:  Location of Christchurch urban area. 
 
At 12.51pm (NZ Standard Time) on February 22, 2011, a M 
6.3 earthquake occurred 10 km south-east the centre of 
Christchurch Central Business District, CBD, at a shallow 
depth of 5 to 6 km.  The earthquake resulted in destruction, 
injuries and deaths.  The event is believed to involve a blind 
oblique-thrust rupture of an 8 x 8 km fault striking ~59° and 
dipping ~69° to the southeast. The peak slip of 2.5–3 m is a 
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mixture of reverse and right-lateral slip and is located ~7 km 
east-southeast of Christchurch city centre at a depth of ~4 km. 
Slip of ~1 m reaches within ~1 km of the ground surface 
beneath the southern edge of the Avon-Heathcote Estuary 
(Beaven et al. 2011). The fault dips southwards at an angle of 
about 65 degrees from the horizontal beneath the Port Hills. 
There appears to have been no surface rupture, however 
satellite images indicate the net displacement of the land south 
of the fault was 500 mm westwards and upwards.  It is a 
shallow fault with high fault friction and co-seismic stress 
drop, which produced highly directional seismic energy 
towards Christchurch city. The sedimentary basin of 
interbedded layers of gravels and sands underlying 
Christchurch amplified the source ground motion waves and 
lengthened the shaking duration, and thus damage (Guidotti et 
al. 2011; Quigley & Wilson, 2011). The peak ground 
acceleration (PGA) in Christchurch CBD was on average 0.5g 
in both the horizontal and vertical direction. The highest 
acceleration was recorded at Heathcote Valley Primary 
School, 1.7g in the horizontal direction and 2.2g in the vertical 
direction. The earthquake was characterised by a short 
duration, with the severe shaking only lasted 15s (GeoNet 
2011). 
Prior to the 22nd February earthquake, at 4:35am (NZ Standard 
Time) on September 4th, 2010 the rupture of the previously 
unrecognized Greendale strike-slip fault beneath the 
Canterbury Plains of New Zealand‟s South Island produced a 
Mw 7.1 earthquake that caused widespread damage 
throughout the region. The hypocentre was about 40 km west 
of Christchurch City, at a depth of 10 km. The epicentre was 
close to the town of Darfield. The event produced a ≥ 28 km 
long, dextral strikeslip surface rupture trace, aligned 
approximately west-east, with a component of reverse faulting 
at depth (Quigley et al. 2010).  Close to the fault the strong 
ground shaking resulted in felt intensities as much as MM9 
(New Zealand Modified Mercalli Intensity) and peak ground 
accelerations over 1.2g close to the fault.  However, a 
maximum PGA of ~0.3g was experienced in Christchurch 30 
km away (Cousin and McVerry 2010). During this event, 
extensive liquefaction, differential subsidence, and ground 
cracking associated with lateral spreading occurred in areas 
close to major streams and rivers throughout Christchurch, 
Kaiapoi, and Taitapu.  Between September 4 to October 16 
seismicity (M ≥ 3) showed an eastward expanding pattern of 
aftershocks, suggesting an eastern transfer of stress through 
the crust.  
On June 13, 2011 a significant Mw6.1 aftershock struck 
Christchurch in an extension to the continued expanding trend 
of aftershock just east of Christchurch.  The faulting 
mechanism was primarily dextral strike-slip with some 
oblique thrust movements.  This earthquake caused many 
areas to re-liquefy resulting in additional lifeline disruptions. 
Liquefaction 
Christchurch city is built at the coast of the Canterbury Plains 
on swamps, which have been mainly drained.  In the western 
suburbs the deposits are mainly coarse gravels with the 
groundwater levels between 2-3 m below ground surface. In 
the eastern suburbs near the coast, swamp, beach dune sand, 
estuarine and lagoon deposits of silts and fine sands become 
more prevalent.  Groundwater levels are between 0-2 m below 
ground surface, making these areas prone to liquefaction.  The 
aquifer fed Avon and Heathcote rivers meander through the 
city and act as the main drainage system.  Variable foundation 
conditions as a consequence of a high water table and lateral 
changes from river floodplain, swamp, and estuarine lagoonal 
environments, impose constraints on building design and 
construction (Brown et al., 1995; Yamada et al. 2011). Most 
soils are generally classified as site subsoil class "D", i.e. deep 
or soft soil in terms of the New Zealand Standard used for 
determining earthquake loads (NZS1170.5, 2004). The subsoil 
generally comprises 15-45 m deep sediments overlying a 300 
to 700 m thick inter-layered gravel formation.  
The 22nd February 2011 earthquake caused significant 
liquefaction in areas throughout the Christchurch southern and 
eastern suburbs; notably Avondale, Avonside, Bexley, 
Bromley and Dallington (Yamada et al. 2011). Liquefaction 
induced ground damage was much more extensive and severe 
than in September 2010, mainly due to the much higher 
shaking intensities.  In general, the most significant damage to 
lifelines and residential buildings was due to liquefaction.  The 
liquefaction resulted in settlement, lateral spreading, sand 
boils, and a large quantity of ejected silt mud and water 
ponding onto the soil surface. This severely damaged 
foundations on thousands of residential homes in the eastern 
suburbs and CBD.  The repeated liquefaction events led to 
cumulative damage, intensifying overall impacts.  Lateral 
spreading close to the Avon and Heathcote rivers and the 
estuary lead to the significant impacts to foundations and 
buried services.  Many bridges crossing the Avon River 
suffered tilting in their abutments due to lateral spreading and 
loss of bearing capacity due to liquefaction (Yamada et al. 
2011). Fault and liquefaction induced subsidence, lateral 
spreading and heaving of the river-bed reducing channel 
volume, and settling of levees has significantly increased 
flood risk from the Avon river, requiring emergency levee 
construction and new storm water network construction.  
Two liquefaction reconnaissance maps have been produced 
following the earthquake. One commissioned by the 
Earthquake Commission (EQC) assessed most of the land 
damage to residential areas (Tonkin and Taylor, 2011). A 
drive-through reconnaissance was conducted in the period 
from 23 February to 1 March to capture surface evidence of 
liquefaction as quickly as possible and quantifying its severity 
in a consistent and systematic manner (Cubrinovski and 
Taylor, 2011).   
Rockfall and Rockslope Failure 
The southern and south-eastern suburbs of Christchurch are 
constructed on the Port Hills, which were constructed 9.6-12 
million years ago by the now extinct Lyttelton volcano.  The 
Port Hills consist mainly of jointed basaltic lava flows, 
commonly interbedded with layers of clay-rich tuffaceous and 
epiclastic deposits.  The crater rim is a series of lava flow 
outcrops and reaches up to 500 m above sea level on the 
northern flanks. On the eastern seaward side the lava flows 
have been eroded by coastal processes during the last 
glaciation (ending ~6,000 years ago), forming steep cliffs, a 
shore platform beneath and a series of small harbours.  The 
most significant, Lyttelton, is used as the major port for 
Christchurch City and the Canterbury region.  Most of the Port 
Hills are also covered in variable thicknesses of loess soils, 
which are vulnerable to mass movement failure.  Prior to the 
22 February 2011 earthquake rock falls, boulder roll and loess 
soil failure had been the only significant slope hazard 
considered for the Port Hills.  Large scale rock slope collapse 
had not been seriously considered as an expected hazard. 
The extremely high ground-shaking during the 22 February 
and 13 June earthquakes in the northern Port Hills lead to 
extensive rockfalls and rock slope failures.  Rockfalls mostly 
occurred from the jointed lava flows, leading to tens of houses 
being impacted by falling rock in Redcliffs, Heathcote Valley, 
Lyttelton, Rapaki and Sumner.  The time of day (mid-day) 
meant few were occupied which reduced the number of 
potential casualties.  The mitigation measures in place (fences, 
benches and trees) were overwhelmed by the large number 
and volume of rocks, which came down off the hills (Bell, 
2011). During the 22 February and 13 June earthquakes, large-
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scale cliff collapses occurred in Redcliffs and Sumner (south-
east Christchurch suburbs).  Up to 15 m of cliff failed along 
sub-vertical cooling fractures and through intact rock during 
each shaking event due to very high vertical and horizontal 
accelerations ( >1.0g).  This lead to hundreds of houses being 
severely damaged, requiring evacuation, and ~100 houses 
unlikely to be reoccupied both at the cliff top and base (Bell, 
2011).  Power, water and sewage services were also severely 
damaged in the hill suburbs.  Clifton Hill collapses threatened 
the seaward road linking Red Cliffs and Sumner to 
Christchurch city, requiring the use of ballasted shipping 
containers to be used as a temporary catch fence (Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3: Cliff collapse at Clifton Hill following the 22 
February and 13 June 2011 earthquakes - flown 
14 June 2011.  Note the partially collapsed house 
and use of ballasted shipping containers as 
temporary catch fences (Photo credit: Marlène 
Villenueve/David Bell).   
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM 
The Electric Power system serving the Christchurch area is 
provided by two companies: Transpower and Orion. 
Transpower operates the high voltage country-wide 
transmission system, with highest voltages in the Christchurch 
area of 220 kV, along with some 66 kV. Orion is the local 
power distribution company, which conveys power from 
Transpower to end user customers, with common voltages of 
66 kV, 33 kV and 11 kV. The performance and management 
of the Transpower high-voltage transmission grid and the 
Orion sub-transmission and distribution system is presented in 
the following sub-sections. 
High voltage transmission grid 
Transpower New Zealand owns and operates the high voltage 
electricity transmission grid in New Zealand. Some of the 
most important assets of the South Island grid are located in 
the Christchurch area (Figure 4), including 10 transmission 
grid exit points (GXP) to the distribution networks operated 
by Orion. In particular, the Islington substation (where power 
is transformed from 220 kV to 66 kV) is the main nodal 
substation in the South Island, which supplies a high 
percentage of the load to Christchurch, Nelson, Marlborough 
and the West Coast (McGhie and Tudo-Bornarel, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 4: Transpower assets (substations and transmission 
lines) affected by the 4 September 2010 and 22 
February 2011 earthquakes (Photo credit: 
Transpower).   
The 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes 
challenged the transmission grid resilience in the Canterbury 
and northern South Island region, but the impact from both 
earthquakes on the electrical stability and operation of both 
National Grid and regional supply was negligible. In 
particular, following the 22nd February earthquake the power 
to the National Grid was unaffected, while power to the 
feeders into Christchurch City and regional substations was 
unavailable for up to 4.5 hours while safety checks and minor 
repairs were made.  After the safety checks, the supply at the 
grid exit points was restored to full capacity and n-1 security, 
except at the Bromley substation where supply was restored 
with an n security level (Transpower 2011a; Transpower 
2011b).  
Load losses were experienced at different substations 
including: i) Bromley, loss of 90 MW and the load dropped to 
zero, twice after the earthquake; ii) Addington, loss of 80 
MW; iii) Papanui, loss of about 80 MW; iv) Springston loss of 
5 MW. The load took a maximum of 150 hours to recover to 
pre-quake levels (see Transpower 2011b for details).  
Only minor structural damage of transmission assets was 
experienced (McGhie and Tudo-Bornarel, 2011). Most of the 
damage caused by the 22 February 2011 earthquake to 
Transpower assets occurred at Bromley, which experienced 
very high ground accelerations (Figure 5) and Papanui 
substations.  Some minor damage occurred at Transpower‟s 
Addington warehouse, which consisted of local buckling of 
the pallet racking structures and collapse of one shelf.  
A number of transmission towers were sited on ground, which 
experienced extreme liquefaction, but they were not adversely 
affected nor was the performance of the transmission lines.  
Damage at the Bromley substation occurred in the 66 kV 
switchyards and 220 kV switchyards, where severe 
liquefaction occurred (Figure 5a), and within the adjacent 
control building from where the switchyard equipment is 
controlled and operated via switchboards (Figure 5c). Damage 
to the 220 kV switchyard included a broken 220 kV capacitor 
voltage transformer (CVT; Figure 5a). Damage to the 66 kV 
switchyards included two broken 66 kV transformer bushings 
(replaced by using bushings from a spare transformer 
available on site) and failure of a 66 kV cable circuit. 
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Figure 5: Bromley Substation: a) 220 kV failed current voltage transformer; b) Bromley bracing installed at the front and rear 
of the switchgear panels; c) dislodged ceiling tiles in the control and relay building, (Photo credit: Transpower). 
 
Within the Bromley substation control building, short-term 
remedial work was undertaken soon after the earthquake to 
temporarily repair and enable the 11 kV switchboard 
equipment to return to service (Figure 5b). Action has been 
already taken to rebuild the Bromley substation and to install 
new 11 kV switchgear and switchboard.  The new switchboard 
will be immediately available from an on-going substation 
construction project in Timaru. 
The implementation of the lessons learned following the 1987 
Edgecumbe earthquake, on the need to seismically restrain 
heavy equipment installed in the substations (e.g. transformer 
banks) and the subsequent seismic restraint retrofit 
programme, was demonstrably worthwhile and contributed to 
minimising seismic damage and disruption to the transmission 
grid following the 22nd February earthquake. Transpower will 
continue to reduce the seismic vulnerability of their assets by 
removing or strengthening existing buildings, items of plant 
not complying with Transpower's current Seismic Policy 
(TP.GG 61.02). As part of the lessons learnt following the 
22nd February earthquake, all instruments with insulators held 
by “finger clamps” will be replaced as this type of clamping is 
known and has shown (Figure 5a) to perform poorly during 
earthquakes (McGhie and Tudo-Bornarel, 2011).  
A summary of the Transpower Seismic Policy and further 
details on structural and system performance of the 
Transpower transmission grid can be found in the Transpower 
reports (Transpower 2011a, 2011b) for the 4th September 
Darfield and 22nd February earthquakes, respectively, and the 
TCLEE report (Eidinger and Tang, 2011) for both 
earthquakes.  
 
Low and Medium voltage distribution network 
Orion is the 3rd largest power distributor in New Zealand and 
owns and manages the distribution network across 
Christchurch City and the suburbs affected by the 22 February 
2011 earthquake. Orion‟s network in Christchurch consists of 
66 kV, 33 kV and 11 kV and 400 V underground and 
overhead distribution systems. The 66 kV distribution system 
is supplied from Transpower‟s grid exit points (GXPs) at 
Papanui, Addington, Bromley, Islington and Middleton, which 
feeds 15 district/zone substations (that allow for the voltage 
transformation of 66 kV or 33 kV to 11 kV) in and around 
Christchurch city (Figure 6). Network substations link the sub-
transmission 11 kV system and the 11 kV distribution 
substations (Figures 6 and 7).  Distribution substations (or 
local substations) take 11 kV supply, from either a 
district/zone, a network or another distribution substation and 
supply the consumer‟s 400 V voltage distribution system 
(Figures 6 and 7).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Orion sub-transmission overhead and underground distribution network (Orion AMP 2009). 
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Figure 7:  Orion simplified network structure (Orion media release, 22 June 2011). 
 
The impact of the 22nd February earthquake vastly exceeded 
previous disruptions to Orion‟s network. With an estimate of 
629 million customer-minutes lost, it resulted in 20 times 
more outages than were experienced during the 1992 
snowstorm, the most significant natural hazard event affecting 
Orion network, before the 4th September earthquake.  
The cost of the 22nd February event for Orion was ten times 
greater than the 4 September 2010 event (Table 1).  
 
Table 1.  Some data on the impact of 4th September 2010 
earthquake, 22nd February 2011 earthquake and 
13th June 2011 aftershock on the Orion network. 
 Restoration of 
90% of the 
service 
Estimated 
Cost 
Customer 
minutes lost 
4th Sept 
2010 
Day 1 $4M ~90M 
22nd Feb 
2011 
Day 10 $40-50M ~ 629M 
13th June 
2011  
Day 1 $3M  
 
Physical impact on the overhead and underground 
distribution network 
The large ground deformation induced by the 22nd February 
earthquake badly affected and caused multiple faults in 66 kV 
and 11 kV underground cable networks, inducing major power 
outages and loss of functionality to the power distribution 
system.  
Of the 66 kV underground cable network, 50% of cables were 
damaged, 30 km out of a total of 60 km. All major 66 kV 
cables, supplying Dallington & Brighton zone substations 
(north-east area of Christchurch, Figure 6) were damaged 
beyond repair and had to be abandoned. These cables were 
pairs of radial 66 kV 3-core aluminium (300 mm2Al), oil 
filled, aluminium sheathed with an outer cover of semi-
conducting plastic sheath over the aluminium. The two cables 
were laid in a common weak mix concrete trench (750 mm 
depth) spaced 300 mm apart and capped by a 50 mm layer of 
stronger concrete (Orion AMP 2009).   
Multiple faults were, also, identified in the 66 kV underground 
cables located within and close by the Christchurch CBD, 
namely: the 66 kV cable from Transpower Addington GXP to 
Orion Armagh substation; and the 66 kV cable from Orion 
Lancaster to Orion Armagh district substations. It is worth 
highlighting that the 66 kV cable from Orion Lancaster to 
Orion Armagh zone substations is a 1,600 mm2 3x1 single 
core copper cross-linked polyethylene, cable Cu XLPE, 
recently installed 2002 (Figure 8a). This cable is installed in a 
weak mix of thermally stabilised concrete and capped with a 
50 mm layer of stronger concrete that has been dyed red. The 
66 kV cable from Transpower Addington GXP to Orion 
Armagh substation are 300 mm2Al cables with similar features 
to the ones serving Christchurch north-east areas, described 
above. Figure 9 presents Orion 66 kV faulted cables and 
(following the 22nd February Earthquake overlaid with 
Tonkin and Taylor liquefaction map (Tonkin and Taylor 2011) 
Regarding the 11 kV underground cable network, 14% cables 
were damaged, 330 km out of a total of 2,300 km (Figure 8b). 
A total of more than 1000 faults were identified and repaired 
at 31st August (Orion Media release 31st August 2011). The 
affected 11 kV cables were either aluminium, or copper core 
cables of different length, diameters and types, including: 
paper lead; paper-insulated lead-covered, armoured, PILCA; 
PILCA HDPE cables, PILCA with a high density polyethylene 
HDPE outer jacket; cross-linked polyethylene, XLPE cables 
with PVC and HDPE protective outer jackets.   
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 8: a) 66 kV XLPE cable fault; b) Typical 11 kV 
internal cable damage (Photo credit:  Orion). 
Figure 10 presents Orion 11 kV faulted cables following 22nd 
February earthquake overlaid with Tonkin and Taylor 
liquefaction map (Tonkin and Taylor 2011) and the “Drive-
Through” Reconnaissance map (Cubrinovski and Taylor, 
2011). It is worth noting that the two land damage maps show 
a general agreement with each other. Table 2 summaries the 
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percentage of 11 kV cables faults falling within the differently 
affected ground damages areas identified by the “driving 
through” liquefaction survey (Cubrinovski and Taylor, 2011).   
 
Table 2.  Percentage of 11 kV cables faults in different 
land damage category ranges following the 22nd 
February Christchurch Earthquake. 
Land Damage Category 
(Cubrinovski and Taylor, 2011) 
% 11 kV cable faults 
Moderate to Severe Liquefaction 86% 
Minor to Moderate Liquefaction 8% 
Minor Land Damage 6% 
An analysis of the 11 kV cable faults following the 4th 
September 2010 earthquake, 22nd February 2010 earthquake 
and 13th June 2011 aftershock is in progress to ascertain the 
possible influence of certain cable characteristics (including 
cable material, diameter) or external factors (e.g ground 
topography, liquefaction extent, transient ground 
deformation), on the cable damage rate. 
Regarding the low-voltage 400 V underground cable network, 
0.6% of cables suffered multiple damages.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Orion 66 kV faulted cables following 22nd February Earthquake. 
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Figure 10:  Orion 11 kV faulted cables following 22nd February Earthquake liquefaction maps from Tonkin and Taylor (2011) 
and Cubrinovski and Taylor (2011).
 
The 33 kV, 11 kV and 400 V overhead lines experienced some 
relatively minor damage including cracked insulators and 
poles affected by liquefaction (Figure 11).  
Physical impact on zone and distribution substations and 
administrative buildings 
One zone substation (out of 51) suffered from liquefaction. 
The Brighton substation (Bexley Road) in New Brighton sank 
two metres into the ground due to ground settlement (Figure 
12a). 
Of approximately 300 distribution building substations located 
in Christchurch urban area only 4 experienced significant 
damage. The Sumner substation was hit by a rockfall (Figure 
12b).   
The Orion Administrative buildings, located in the CBD, were 
badly affected and evacuated following the 22nd February 
earthquake. However, the control centre was re-established 
within 2 hours as a hot site established in an adjacent building 
that did not suffer major damage.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11:  Damage to the distribution over-head lines: a). 
(Top) Leaning poles due to a combination of 
shaking and liquefaction in Kingsley street; b). 
Poles and insulators along the Sumner road 
affected by rockfall and landslides. (Photo 
credit: Andrew Massie CPIT). 
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Figure 12:  Damage to Orion substation: a) (Left) New Brighton substation . (Photo credit: Orion.; b) Sumner substation hit by 
a boulder falling form the Sumner Cliffs (Photo credit: Andrew Massie CPIT). 
 
Emergency management and restoration activities  
Despite the severe physical impact of the earthquake on the 
Orion distribution and sub-transmission network, Orion was 
able to restore the power to about 50% of occupied households 
on the day of the event, 75% after 2 days, 90% within 10 days 
and 98% after 2 weeks.  
 
Temporary 66 kV overhead lines were installed on an 
emergency basis, within one-week, from Bromley to New 
Brighton (4 kilometre line) and from Bromley to the Orion 
Dallington substation (4.5 kilometre line) to ensure power 
supply to 20,000 customers in north-east Christchurch (Figure 
6). This project would normally take at least six months 
depending on consenting issues (Shane Watson, personal 
communication).  These temporary 66 kV overhead lines will 
represent a long-term temporary solution, for the three years 
that it will take to design and build a permanent supply. 
Options for permanent high voltage supply from Bromley to 
New Brighton and Dallington are currently being investigated 
(October, 2011). 
 
The construction of a new substation in the Rawhiti Domain 
was commissioned, as well, as part of the immediate recovery 
plan to replace the severely damaged New Brighton 
substation. 
More than 600 quake-related underground cable faults to both 
11 kV and 66 kV cables were repaired within three months – 
more faults than Orion is used to experiencing in a decade. 
The approach followed to restore the functionality of the 66 
kV underground cable traversing and serving the Christchurch 
CBD and the faulted 11 kV underground networks has been to 
locate the cable faults by cutting out of the damaged section 
and inserting a new piece of cable with two repair joints, 
whose resistance to further movement induced by potential 
aftershocks can not be, unfortunately, guaranteed. Each of the 
cable faults took more than 12 hours to find and repair. Cable 
crews were assembled from around New Zealand and 
Australia under a mutual aid support agreement.  Following a 
massive work programme fault detection and repair was 
completed by the end of April 2011. 
  
Six months following the 22nd February earthquake, Orion 
completed the major emergency repairs needed to deliver 
power supply across the city. 95% of all known faults (more 
than 1,000) faults to the 11 kV have been repaired. Each one 
of the 4,500 local substations has been individually assessed 
and some of them have been moved. All significant damage to 
the 400 kV overhead lines have been addressed and repaired. 
However, it will be a number of years before the network is 
restored to pre-event levels of functionality.   
In areas where land is to be abandoned, Orion is working with 
demolition and restoration crews to ensure that buildings are 
safely disconnected from the power network before demolition 
or repair activities start.  
The intensive post-quake work plan saw 700 electricity sector 
workers from around New Zealand and Australia contribute 
more than 200,000 people-hours to earthquake recovery 
(Orion Media Release 22 June 2011). Their work and the great 
resilience and the patience of Christchurch people has been 
acknowledged by Orion (Orion Annual Report 2011): “Faced 
with an electricity network decimated in some areas by 
massive earth movement, our people went to work and got the 
power back on. Again and again. Thank you to them, and to 
the people of Canterbury for your support and patience”. 
However all urgent substation repairs were completed within 
four months time following the February event. Significant 
difficulty was also experienced by crews moving about 
congested, damaged and liquefaction affected transportation 
networks in the hours to weeks after the 22 February event.  
This was particularly difficult within the CBD area. 
Further information and photos documenting the restoration of 
the Orion infrastructure can be found in Massie and Watson 
(2011).  
Orion seismic risk mitigation programme  
During the mid 1990s Orion was part of a study investigating 
how natural disasters would affect Christchurch. As a result, 
Orion spent over $6m on seismic protection work and a 
further $35m building resilience into their network. 
Without this earthquake strengthening work, it is likely 
Orion‟s projected $70m earthquake repair bill would have 
more than doubled. In terms of hours without power, the 
impact would have been much worse with weeks and even 
months of continuous power cuts across most of Christchurch. 
Even so, power cuts have been very disruptive. 
The excellent performance, with a few exceptions, of the 
network substations can be attributed to a $6 million seismic 
upgrade program that addressed all Orion substation buildings 
(Orion AMP 2009). Despite the ground motions exceeding the 
design codes of the seismic strengthening programme (in 
some instances this was dramatically exceeded), only 1 of the 
314 upgraded buildings failed. The seismic upgrade 
programme was undoubtedly cost-effective. It is estimated 
that the upgrades saved up to $30-50 million (John O'Donnell, 
personal communication). By comparison, one non-upgraded 
building not required by Orion, was heavily damaged 
following the earthquake.  
Furthermore, the vulnerability of oil filled cables to 
differential ground settlements induced by an earthquake had 
been previously analysed and identified by Orion as potential 
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risks (Orion AMP, 2009). In particular the Dallington to 
Bromley 66 kV cable was identified as high risk, being located 
in the area on the south side of the Avon River. As part of risk 
mitigation actions undertaken by Orion, the Armagh Street 
bridges and the Dallington footbridge traversed by the cable 
were reinforced (Mackenzie, 2011); and a 1,600 mm2 3x1 core 
copper Cross-linked Polyethylene, Cu XLPE, cable was 
installed from the Bromley GXP to Lancaster and Armagh 
district/zone substations (Figure 6) aiming to provide 
additional system security to the Christchurch CBD. This 
cable suffered multiple faults following 22nd February 
earthquake (Figure 10). The faults have been identified and 
repaired (October 2011).  
GAS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
Contact Energy (Rockgas) operates the Liquefied Petroleum 
Gas, LPG distribution system in Christchurch. The LPG is 
typically a mixture of 60% propane and 40% butane and it is 
distributed through a reticulated network at a pressure of about 
90 kPa.  The Contact Energy reticulated pipe network (Figure 
13) comprises approximately 180 km of medium density 
polyethylene, MDPE, pipes. Diameters of the pipes range 
from = 63 mm to = 315 mm. The pipe wall thicknesses is 
6 mm for = 63 mm pipe and 9 mm for =160 mm pipe 
(SDR 17.6 & SDR11). The depth to cover of the pipes is 
typically between 600-800 mm. The pipes are welded using 
electrofusion fittings (Figure 14) and polyethylene PE butt-
welding, where a MDPE pipe is melted to another MDPE pipe 
with a time measured electrical current.  
The LPG network is supplied from one main feed plant, 
Woolston Terminal (Figure 13) supplemented by a pressure 
peaker plant, and three backup plants. The distribution 
network is subdivided into 189 separately valved zones that 
can be manually shut off. Beyond the main distribution 
network, several standalone networks are fed from gas 
cylinders or tanks.  
One hour and half after the 22 February main shock, Contact 
Energy National Operations Manager – LPG received a 
request from Civil Defence to isolate the CBD. The company 
further decided to shut off the feed supplies into the system, as 
a precaution. The CBD isolation and the four feeders of the 
system were shut off as a first step. Key network valves were 
subsequently manually shut off, to aid re-livening. 
Approximately eight technicians were dispatched to isolate the 
system. Damage to the road network and chaotic traffic 
occasionally delayed the aforementioned operations, which 
was partly overcome by using bicycles. Communication issues 
were experienced with the back-up radio system that will be 
now replaced, but the cell system functioned sufficiently by 23 
February to adequately meet the communication needs.     
Re-living operations started the evening of 23 February, 
beginning from the Harewood Feeder (Figure 13). Up to 30 
technicians (22 from Rockgas‟ emergency contractors around 
the South Island and eight from overseas parent company were 
deployed to reliven the system. The system was re-livened 
section by section following the positive outcome of a drop 
test (no leakages detected) after proof residual gas pressure 
was found within the section. No damage was observed both 
to the MDPE distribution pipes or to their welded joints, 
despite the gas company's pipes traversing zones of severe 
liquefaction and ground deformation. A few valve pits had 
moved relative to the road surface where the road surface 
sustained permanent ground deformations. None resulted in 
damage to the valve and connected pipe. One service lateral 
was sheared due to the customer casting concrete around the 
pipe and subsequent differential movement during the 
earthquake. 
The gas mains outside the CBD cordon were re-livened within 
9 days after the earthquake. Reconnection of customers 
continued during and after the re-livening operations of the 
mains and were completed within 10 days after the 
earthquake. Figure 15 presents the Contact Energy gas 
reticulation system and service restoration curves following 
the 22 February 2011 earthquake.  As shown in Figure 15, 
15% of the piping falls within the CBD cordon and could not 
be restored immediately after the earthquake. All services that 
could be restored were restored within 2 weeks.  There were 
many customers who did not restore their gas services due to 
lost buildings, isolation from the CBD, or they left the area.  
As a result, in April 2011 Rockgas had lost 40% of their 
customer services and was providing only about 1/2 of the 
volumes they were supplying prior to the 22 February 2011 
earthquake.  Some additional service recovery will occur over 
time as some people return to Christchurch and as portions of 
the CBD are reopened. As at Nov 11, 6% of mains remains 
within the cordon and is not yet live. Customer re-livening has 
grown to around 80% of pre-earthquake customer numbers.  
The availability of back-up resources was crucial to relieve 
lifelines interdependency issues and to maintain the system 
functionality despite the reduced functionality of the electric 
and water networks. Diesel engine back-up generators 
guaranteed the supply of electric power to the feeder plants. 
Buried storage tanks (500 t) provided several weeks supply for 
the network in case of any ongoing disruption to the business-
as-usual LPG supply through the Lyttelton port. Road haulage 
options were placed on standby. 
The Contact Energy gas system also performed well, without 
damage, in both the 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake 
and 13 June 2011 aftershock.  The gas system performances in 
these three earthquakes was remarkably good compared to the 
performance of reticulated gas networks following large 
earthquakes in other parts of the world, especially those where 
the use of cast iron and other older transmission and 
distribution pipe is still common (Schiff, 1995, 1998). Lessons 
learnt following the Kobe earthquake and the participation in 
the emergency preparedness activities organised by the 
Canterbury Lifelines Group strongly influenced the design of 
a highly resilient system with robust and redundant hardware 
and suitable preparedness thanks to the availability of back-up 
resources (Smith and Yu, personal communication).  
As part of the post-earthquake recovery activities, Contact 
Energy is continuing to work with Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management to ensure the safety of the gas system 
and with demolition crews as damaged buildings are 
demolished. 
 
Figure 13: Contact Energy Service Areas and Pipeline 
Network (Courtesy of Rowan Smith, Contact 
Energy LPG). 
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Figure 14:  Example of MDPE electrofusion joint for the 
Contact Energy pipes 
Despite the excellent performance in multiple earthquakes, as 
indicated in Figure 15, from a broader community perspective 
the gas system could not return to its pre-earthquake service 
levels due to the reduced number of customers as a result of 
the earthquake and related impacts.  
 
Figure 15: Rockgas serviceability following the 22nd 
February2011 earthquake. 
ROAD AND TRANSPORT NETWORK 
Major transport nodes performed well. Christchurch 
International Airport was operational for emergency flight the 
same evening of the earthquake the re-opened at 7.00am on 23 
February, the day after the earthquake. Lyttelton Port was 
located nearly directly at the earthquake‟s epicentre and was 
further affected by liquefaction ground damage and strong 
shaking, but was able to continue functioning almost 
immediately with services re-established to meet demand after 
10 days.  Despite this, it is expected damages and business 
interruption costs will extend to $300 million.  Nearly all rail 
lines opened for freight on 24 February with some speed 
restrictions. The Lyttelton to Christchurch line and West Coast 
to Lyttelton line re-opened on 5 March 2011. The 
functionality of the airport, port and rail lines guaranteed large 
freight movements that were vital to support the emergency 
management operations.  
Road networks were extensively damaged by the significant 
liquefaction that resulted in settlement, lateral spreading, sand 
boils and a large quantity of ejected silt, mud and water 
ponding on the road surface. Most of the State Highways 
remained open. Only-one tunnel of the state highway network 
had extended impacts, Lyttelton Tunnel, which reopened on 
26 February, initially for restricted use.  
Local roads in the eastern suburbs of the city were the most 
affected. 83 sections of 57 roads were closed. Five of the 6 
bridges crossing the Lower Avon were closed and many 
bridges required weight restrictions.  Substantial temporary 
traffic management measures were put in place to manage the 
residual functionality of the road network: including 
temporary speed restrictions (30 kph); adjustments to traffic 
signals; and adjustments to bus routes. Despite the temporary 
traffic management measures and the significant programme 
to speed-up the liquefaction clean-up operations, congestion 
remained problematic for months following the earthquake.   
Pre-earthquake seismic improvements to bridges on Highways 
73 and 74 proved successful in resisting substantial loads and 
keep the highways in operation post-earthquake (Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16:   Pre-earthquake seismic improvements to 
bridges on Highways 73. (Photo credit: Craig 
Davis). 
 
Rockfalls in the Port Hills led to several key road closures due 
to roads being blocked and were an on-going hazard from 
unstable rocks.  Closure included Evans Pass, which provides 
a vital link for oversized or explosive goods between Lyttelton 
Port and the city, and Main Road which links the south-eastern 
suburbs of Redcliffs and Sumner to the city.   
Further details on the structural and system performance of the 
road and transport can be found in the TCLEE report 
(Eidinger and Tang, 2011). A detailed account of the bridge 
response to the 22nd February earthquake can be see in 
Palermo et al. (2011).  
WATER AND WASTEWATER NETWORKS 
Christchurch water and waste networks suffered extensive 
damage as a result of the 22 February 2011 earthquake. A 
review and discussion of the physical impact of the 22 Feb 
earthquake on the water and wastewater networks can be 
found in Eidinger and Tang (2011) and Cubrinovski et al. 
(2011). The TCLEE report (Eidinger and Tang, 2011) also 
includes impacts of the 4th September 2010 and 13 June 2011 
earthquakes.  
The Christchurch City Council, CCC, owns and manages the 
city‟s water and wastewater networks. Following Christchurch 
earthquake, the CCC has been committed to restore the service 
and to keep the community informed on the restoration 
activities progresses. Maps providing an overview of some of 
the key issues and repair work facing the city have been 
published and regularly updated on the CCC website. 
36,000 water and wastewater service requests were received 
and addressed by Christchurch City Council in 5 months 
following the earthquake. 
Approximately, 50% of the city was without water for the first 
days following the earthquake; more than a third of 
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households were without water for over a week. A month on 
from 22 February 2011, over 95% of occupied units (outside 
of the cordoned Christchurch CBD) had water, however a 
“boil order” was in-place for over six weeks for most of the 
city due to potential contamination caused by severe damage 
to the wastewater system.  Chlorination, which was not used 
pre-earthquake, remains a requirement to ensure water is 
disinfected. Water conservation orders are in place as a result 
of damages to key water reservoirs and the loss of many 
groundwater pumping wells; all related to geotechnical 
problems. However, with few exceptions water reservoir 
structures and pump stations performed very well owing to 
pre-earthquake engineering and seismic upgrades (Charman 
and Billings, 2011).  
The water system restoration activities completed within six 
months time following the February event included: 
construction of 12 km of pressure main, reparation of 60 water 
supply wells, renewal of 150 km of water main and of 100 km 
of submain  (Mark Christison, personal communication).   
 
HDPE pipe is being extensively used for all new pressure 
mains as it was found to perform well in the 4th September and 
22nd February earthquakes and 13th June aftershock. Figure 17 
show preliminary results on the performance of different pipe 
material for the Kaiapoi water network following the 4th 
September earthquake. 
 
  
 
Figure 17:  Kaiapoi water network following the 4th Sept, Darfield Earthquake: a)  (Left) Percent of total length of different pipe 
materials within different ground deformation areas; b)  (Right) Number of repairs made on mains and rider mains 
in different levels of ground deformation areas. (Knight, 2011). 
The city continues to rely heavily on a temporary sewage 
service facilitated by chemical and portable toilets to 
supplement the fractured and fragile wastewater system 
(Stevenson et al. 2011).  Christchurch City Council set a target 
of returning sewer services to all homes by the end of August 
and contractors have been working 24 hours a day, seven days 
a week since early March to achieve this goal. Work has been 
completed on all public sewer pipes, however as at 31 August 
there are still around 800 houses with damage to their private 
sewer pipes which needs to be addressed before full service is 
returned. Contractors have completed 500 such repairs to date 
and are working with EQC to get these completed as soon as 
possible. Portable toilets will remain on city streets where they 
are still needed. 
Raw sewage continues to be disposed in the rivers and 
estuaries due to the inability to treat the waste as a result of 
significant liquefaction induced damage at the Bromley Waste 
Water Treatment Plant.  The treatment plant has been unable 
to perform any more then partial primary treatment since the 
February 22 earthquake.  Some sewage is bypassed directly to 
the lagoons and other pumped directly into rivers.  Concerns 
abound about the lagoons going anaerobic and emitting a 
stench across the city.  The treatment plant was also repeatedly 
damaged by sand and silt, which flowed into broken sewage 
pipes when the ground liquefied, continually washed into the 
basins.  The plant was not designed for such heavy solids.   
Water and wastewater services continue to be impacted by 
significant aftershocks that liquefy the soils, including 
significant damages caused by the June 13 aftershock.  It will 
take years to return the water and wastewater systems to pre-
earthquake functions.  Further studies are warranted to assess 
the water and sewer system‟s seismic resilience and means to 
improve future system performances  
LIQUEFACTION CLEAN UP 
The 22nd February 2011 earthquake induced widespread 
liquefaction phenomena across the Christchurch urban area 
that resulted in widespread ejection of silt and fine sand 
(Figure 18).  This created unique impacts to many lifelines.  
Road networks with significant liquefaction ejecta deposits 
were difficult to transit or impassable for two-wheel drive 
traffic and contributed to traffic congestion. Liquefaction 
ejecta, continually erodeding over time, had the potential to 
infiltrate and contaminate the damaged storm water system 
and the urban waterways. Due to the extensive damage to the 
sewage disposal networks, there was the risk that much of the 
liquefaction ejecta had been contaminated with raw sewage 
creating a long-term health risk to the population (P. 
McDonald & J. Rutherford pers. comm., 2011; Weerasekara, 
2011). During hot and windy conditions the dry, finer portions 
of silt was mobilised by the wind creating a respiratory health 
hazard.   
With thousands of residential properties inundated with 
liquefaction ejecta, residents were eager to remove it from 
their properties to restore household functionality, remove the 
depressing grey deposits and retain a sense of control and 
normality. Wet or moist silt was also much easier to handle 
compared to when it had dried, as it became denser, hardened 
and was more difficult to remove (P. McDonald, pers. comm., 
2011). However, with hundreds of thousands of tonnes of 
sediment to clear, many residents lacked the capacity (time or 
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resources) to clean up their properties without external 
assistance.    
 
Figure 18: Piles of liquefaction ejecta cleaned from 
residential properties and roads, ready for 
removal by heavy earth moving machinery at 
Bracken Street in the suburb of Avonside. 
(Photo credit: Jarg Pettinga). 
Cleanup Coordination 
The liquefaction silt clean up response was co-coordinated by 
the Christchurch City Council (CCC) and executed by a 
network of contractors (including Fulton-Hogan Ltd and City 
Care Ltd) and volunteer groups, including the „Farmy Army‟ – 
a group organized by rural organizations and made up mainly 
of farmers and rural workers – and the „Student Army‟ – a 
group organized by the University of Canterbury Students 
Association and made up mainly of tertiary students. The 
rapid and very generous response to any request from local 
and international businesses and individuals encouraged 
everyone involved.  
The liquefaction cleanup process included the following four 
subsequent steps: 1) initially cleanup operated by contractors 
using heavy machinery; 2) difficult to reach areas, e.g. 
residential properties and the area around vehicles cleared by 
teams of volunteers; 3) removal of the silt piled up in the street 
by the volunteers operated by contractors; 4) final cleaning via 
water-carts (truck mounted water tank and sprinkler system) to 
suppress windblown silt from the roads and to clean the silt 
possibly left into the storm water system (P. McDonald 2011, 
pers. comm., 2011). 
The liquefaction cleanup operation required significant 
coordination of resources.  During the peak cleanup after the 
22 February 2011 earthquake it was estimated in excess of 
1,500 people working on the cleanup, along with 
approximately 1,000 student and Farming volunteers (Fulton 
2011).  At the peak, the Burwood landfill was accepting 1 
truck every 20 seconds into the waste disposal area (D. Harris, 
pers comm., 2011).  
The use of a coordinated incident management system (CIMS) 
and staff trained in its use was essential for managing the 
clean up (Peter McDonald, pers. comm., 2011). Furthermore, 
all the parties involved acknowledged that the lessons from the 
first clean up in September-October 2010 contributed to a 
more efficient and effective clean up following February and 
June events. Also, a job dispatch and mobile workforce 
management system, GEOOP, donated to the Student-Army 
was successfully experimented and used for coordinating the 
works of volunteers around the city. 
 
The majority of liquefaction ejecta was disposed at the 
Burwood Landfill, identified as part of disaster planning, as a 
storage area for disaster waste (D. Harris pers. comm., 2011).  
The Burwood landfill in Bottle Lake Forest (map) had been 
operational from 1984-2005 serving Christchurch‟s waste 
disposal needs and at the time of the earthquake was 
undergoing a final stages of restoration and remediation work 
(started in 2010). 
Because of the severity of the road damage following the 22 
February 2011 earthquake and the huge volumes of silt, 
further strategic locations were identified to temporarily 
stockpile silt (Figure 19; D. Harris, personal communication, 
2011).   
 
Figure 19:  Estimated > 400,000 tonnes of liquefaction silt 
removed from the Christchurch urban area 
after the February 22 earthquake at the 
Burwood landfill disposal site. 
Duration and estimated Cleanup Cost 
The duration of the clean up time of residential properties and 
the road network was approximately 2 months following the 
4th September and 22nd February 2011 earthquakes and 13th 
June aftershock (Table 3).   
Table 3: Estimated mass of silt removed by Fulton Hogan 
in Christchurch between September 2010 and 
August 2011 (Fulton 2011). 
 
4 September 2010 – early November 
2011 
31,000 tonnes 
22 February - April 2011 (mostly 
completed by late March) 
315,655 tonnes  
13 June – early August  2011 87,364 tonnes  
Total  434,019 tonnes 
 
During the period of data collection the final financial cost of 
the cleanup effort to contractors was not available. However, 
from available sources the estimated cost of cleanup at 
September 2011) is summarised in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Estimated costs of liquefaction clean up following 
the 4 Sept 2010, 22 Feb and 13 June 2011 
earthquakes in Christchurch (P. McDonald; D. 
Harris; J. Rutherford pers comm., 2011). 
 
Item Estimated Cost 
 Subtotal Total 
Disposal Site 
Running 
Costs 
$1,200,000 (1 
month post 22 
Feb 2011) 
 
 $500,000 (est. 
post 4 Sept 
2010) 
 
 $500,000 (est. 
post 13 June 
2011) $2,200,000 
Disposal Site 
Infrastructure 
 
$800,000 
Transport and 
disposal of 
500,000 
tonnes of silt 
 
$2,500,000 
Contractor 
Staff Time 
 
$2,000,000 
Estimated 
volunteers 
labour 
contribution  
$1,000,000 
(Student Army) 
 
 $1,000,000 
(Farmy Army) $2,000,000 
Donations to 
the Student 
Army 
$20,000 (MSD) 
 
 $10,000 (Mitre 
10/ANZ 
wheelbarrows)  
 $30,000 (other 
donations) $60,000 
Total 
Estimated 
Costs 
 
$9,560,000 
 
 
The liquefaction clean-up experience in Christchurch 
following the 2010-2011 earthquake sequence has emerged as 
a valuable case study to support further analysis and research 
on the management, logistics and costs not only for 
liquefaction related phenomena, but also any kind of hazard 
which might cause the deposit of large volumes of fine 
grained sediment in urban areas, (e.g. volcanic ash or 
flooding; see Johnston et al. 2001). 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake created very 
strong ground motions and widespread liquefaction 
throughout the Christchurch urban area and surroundings, 
leading to significant damage and disruption of lifeline 
systems.  It was well established that large areas of eastern 
Christchurch were built on ground highly susceptible to 
liquefaction, however seismic hazard assessments, prior to the 
4 September 2010 Darfield earthquake, never anticipated the 
possibility of a large earthquake occurring directly under the 
city. The 22 February 2011 earthquake exceeded hazard 
assessment estimates and design codes, yet many systems 
continued to function, albeit in a reduce state, mitigating the 
impact of the event on the Christchurch and New Zealand 
economies and communities.   
The value of resilient design, interdependency planning, 
mutual assistance agreements, extensive insurance cover and 
highly trained and adaptable human resources are the 
successful stories that this paper aims to highlight. The gas 
system showed an excellent level of robustness, remaining 
undamaged despite the high level of ground shaking and 
liquefaction-induced ground damage. The implementation of 
lesson learnt from previous damaging earthquakes, contributed 
to the design of such a robust and redundant network.  Limited 
interdependency issues were experienced between lifelines 
systems, with generally a good level of coordination and 
communication experienced among the lifelines utilities and 
with the National and Local emergency operations and 
coordination centres.  All the lifelines utility had mutual aid 
agreements and contingency measures in place that helped 
them to guarantee the prompt availability of materials and 
technical experts required for the repair operations. Many of 
the lifeline utilities had the availability of back-up resources 
that helped them to cope with the reduced functionality of 
other networks. 
However the event has also highlighted the challenge of 
managing aging infrastructure, of which components are 
known to be vulnerable, but are too expensive to be 
replaced/upgraded in the short-term as part of risk mitigation 
programmes. Weak buried pipes and cables, played a major 
role in the seismic response of the water, wastewater and 
power systems.  
 
The 22nd February earthquake also demonstrated that some 
emergency management and response issues have still to be 
addressed to improve future pre-event planning. The 
temporary traffic-management of the city and highway 
network faced severe challenges to adapt to the damaged 
network and to the reorganisation of the city, as businesses 
and residents relocated following the closure, demolition and 
rebuild of the CBD. The management of the cordon caused 
frustration, as strict access protocols made it difficult for 
lifelines utilities and their contractors to service key sites. A 
police escort for utilities was provided sporadically upon 
request. The 22nd February event has also exposed the 
difficulties in re-optimising a city's infrastructure following 
closure of its CBD for an extended period. 
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The Christchurch earthquake has also shown that societal, 
economic and political expectations for a lifeline system‟s 
functionality in a post-disaster environment continue to rise.  
The widespread disruption to services caused significant social 
impacts, leading to major economic disruption, political 
involvement and social trauma - which contributed in part to 
the migration of thousands of Christchurch residents out of 
affected areas.  However, it has to be acknowledged that 
community members showed incredible levels of resilience, 
coping and adapting to the, sometime, long lifeline restoration 
times and repeated outages during aftershocks. 
The event has provided a wealth of lessons for increasing the 
resilience of engineering lifelines in New Zealand and beyond. 
This event will no doubt be regarded as a reference example of 
the impact of severe liquefaction-induced ground damage on 
lifeline systems and overall on a urban environment.   
As a last word of this paper, we would like to acknowledge the 
significant contribution made by members of the original 
Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Project team in the mid 
1990s to increasing Christchurch's lifeline infrastructure 
resilience to hazards.  This ground-breaking work, lead by 
John Lamb, has been continued by former and current 
members of the Canterbury Engineering Lifelines Group.  
Their contribution has greatly reduced service disruption, 
repair costs and ultimately societal disruption for this 
generation of Cantabrians, and the legacy will continue to 
benefit future generations. 
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